Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

which, up to quantities of the order $1/c^2$ is equal to 1, then it follows[10] that for positions x_1, y_1, z_1 of m_1 and their corresponding time-positions, Kepler's laws would again obtain, except that in place of the times t_1 the characteristic time τ_1 of m would be substituted.

On the basis of this simple observation we can see that the proposed law of attraction in conjunction with the new mechanics would be no less suitable for explaining astronomical observations than Newton's law of attraction in conjunction with the Newtonian mechanics.

The fundamental equations for electromagnetic processes in ponderable bodies are likewise in complete harmony with the world-postulate. Even the derivation of these equations, as taught by Lorentz, on the basis of conceptions of the electron theory need not for this end by any means be abandoned, as I shall show elsewhere.[11]

The universal validity of the world-postulate is, I should believe, the true core of an electromagnetic world-picture; first discovered by Lorentz, then further developed by Einstein, it is now clearly discernible. In the future development of its mathematical consequences enough indications will be found for experimental verification of the postulate to reconcile by the idea of a pre-established harmony between pure mathematics and physics even those to whom a surrender of old accustomed view-points is uncongenial or painful.

HERMANN MINKOWSKI.

SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW LOGIC.

The world of logic is in a state of disturbance. A new logic is wanted and anxiously sought after. The logisticians are active and non-Aristotelian thinkers are presenting solutions. Among those dissatisfied with both the traditional and modern logic there is one man of particular originality and distinction. It is Dr. Charles Mercier of Charing Cross Hospital, London, and we take pleasure in presenting a review of his work.

DR. MERCIER'S LOGICAL WORK.

Dr. Charles A. Mercier is a physician whose specialty is mental pathology. Believing that in mental as in bodily disorder the study of order is indispensable to the study of disorder, and that in mental disease the power of logical reasoning is often impaired, he thinks the knowledge of an adequate and correct logic very important and necessary. For this purpose he has found the traditional logic defective in every particular. Nor does he agree with Mill and the modern logicians who follow him, although they too found fault with the traditional school. He has frankly confessed that he does not understand their logic, and the symbolic logic of the logicians is even less satisfactory to him for this he considers no logic at all but "mathematics gone mad." Therefore he has written *A New Logic* of his own in a volume of 422 pages[1] which, though not complete and of course not wholly new, yet is different enough from all previous expositions to warrant the name. He regards his system as an organized and coherent body of doctrine, covering the whole field of reasoning, growing naturally from a single root and forming a harmonious and interdependent whole. And he hopes it will prove of great practical value in clarifying the ideas of the thoughtful and intelligent public with regard to the laws of reasoning. It is impossible to give any comprehensive summary of his method here, for he takes up the defects of the time-honored system one by one, and then in each case works out his own corresponding theory. But we can include here his sweeping indictment of traditional logic, which will give some idea of the scope of his contemplated reform. He says: "In my opinion, its concepts of the composition of the proposition, and of the constituent parts of the proposition, are erroneous; its doctrines of quantity and quality are wrong; its immediate inferences are but a poor few out of multitudes that may be obtained by an adequate logic; the few immediate inferences it does obtain are faulty; its doctrine of the syllogism is artificial and mistaken; the rules of the syllogism are all wrong; there are multitudes of mediate inferences that cannot be reached by the syllogism;....in short, its whole system is insufficient, defective, and erroneous from beginning to end."

---

[10] H. Minkowski, *Ges. Abhandlungen,* II, p. 403.

[11] This idea is developed in the paper: "Eine Ableitung der Grundgleichungen für die elektromagnetischen Vorgänge in bewegten Körpern vom Standpunkte der Elektronentheorie. Aus dem Nachlass von Hermann Minkowski bearbeitet von Max Born in Göttingen. ***Mathematische Annalen,*** Vol. LXVIII, 1910, p. 526; *Ges. Abhandlungen,* Vol. II, p. 405.

Dr. Mercier takes issue with Mill and subsequent writers when they devote a chapter of their logic to the subject of causation and insist that causation lies at the root of induction, for he believes that causation no more belongs to the subject matter of logic than rotation or imitation; that it is neither a principle nor method, but rather an example or application of reasoning. It is for this reason that his own treatment of causation is not included in *A New Logic* but is given in a volume by itself.[2] Dr. Mercier writes a direct and trenchant style. He is not only a critic of logic but proves to be a keenly logical critic, and his fearlessness of spirit and acuteness of mind are shown most delightfully in the first chapter of *Causation* which is devoted to the theories of Hume, Mill, Mr. Welton, Professor Pearson, Mr. Bertrand Russell and Dr. McTaggart. We will quote some of his more scathing and fun-provoking passages on the three last named, though for the full line of the author's critical arguments we must refer our readers to the book itself. On pages 18 to 31 he says:

---

[1] London: Longmans Green and Co.; Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1912.

"Much of the authority that Prof. Pearson's *Grammar of Science* has unquestionably achieved is due to his habit of attributing his own opinions to a personified science, a trick that enables him to pose as infallible, while adroitly avoiding the appearance of arrogance that such a pose carries with it. When he says that for science cause is meaningless, he means that Professor Pearson does not understand the meaning of it; when he says that science can in no case demonstrate this or that, he means that Professor Pearson cannot demonstrate it; when he says that science can find no element of enforcement in causation, he means that Professor Pearson is too blind to see the element of enforcement; and so on. This is an adroit method of imposing on the gullibility of his readers, for who, in these 'scientific' days, would have the temerity to question the pronouncements of science? But I must confess to some surprise that it has been so successful. I should have thought that it might have occurred to some one that science in this sense is only a name for a body of opinion; a body of fluctuating opinion, varying from time to time and from person to person, so that what is science to-day was heresy yesterday, and will be superstition to-morrow; what is science to one is stupidity to another, and falsehood to a third. What is science to Professor Pearson, for instance, is nonsense to me.

"Professor Pearson belongs to the school of Hume and Mill, and with them denies that there is any 'enforcement' of an effect by its cause, or any necessary connection between them. The cause is merely the antecedent, the effect merely the subsequent. The one happens to follow the other, but there is no reason or necessity why it should be so: they are in no way connected; but when we see repeated instances of the same succession of events, we deludedly jump to the conclusion that the predecessor is the cause of the successor. Almost as soon as it was stated, Reid blew this doctrine sky high by adducing the instance of night and day. Day always precedes night, and night always follows day, but no one supposes that day is the cause of night or that night is the effect of day. And why not? Manifestly because they are merely antecedent and subsequent; because there is no power in day to produce night; because there is no enforcement of night by day....By cause we do not mean mere antecedence, nor by effect do we mean mere succession. If we did, we should accept day as the cause of night, and night as the effect of day. If we did, the old and notorious fallacy, *post hoc, ergo propter hoc,* would be no fallacy: it would be an unassailable truth; yet the same logicians who declare in their chapters on occasion and induction that causation is nothing but sequence, declare in their chapter on fallacies that it is fallacious to argue from *post hoc* to *propter hoc.* But no inconsistency or self-contradiction in a doctrine ever yet deterred logicians from teaching it; and no doubt they will continue to teach this self-contradiction along with the rest, until the whole silly pseudo-science is swept away, and goes to join judicial astrology, phrenology, and humoral pathology upon the rubbish heap.

---

[2] *On Causation with a Chapter on Belief.* London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916.

"Professor Pearson goes with the crowd, and quotes as from Mill the definition that causation is uniform antecedence; and this definition, says Professor Pearson, is perfectly in accord with scientific concept—that is, with Professor Pearson's concept. It may be a good definition, but when Professor Pearson says it is John Stuart Mill's definition, he is mistaken. Among all of Mill's many definitions of cause and causation this one is not to be found. In this instance 'science' is at fault....

"The most popular doctrine of Professor Pearson's is his distinction between *how* and *why,* a distinction which is either the cause, or the chief effect, of his theory of causation. He denies that we can ever discover *why* a thing happens, or explain it; and limits our powers to saying *how* it happens, or describing it. In this he is demonstrably wrong. It is often as impossible to describe how things happen as to explain why they happen: it is often as easy to explain why they happen as to describe how they happen. The fact is that both *how* and *why* are equivocal words, having more than one meaning; but whichever meaning we take, what I have said is true....

"A good example of the manner in which Professor Pearson poses as a superior being is the advice he gives to his readers, to analyze what is meant by such statements as that the law of gravitation *causes* bodies to fall to the earth. The law, he says, really describes how bodies do fall. Of course it does; but before Professor Pearson gave this advice to his readers, he should have shown some evidence that some one besides himself had ever said such a silly thing. As far as I know, no one has ever pretended that the *law* of gravitation causes bodies to fall to the earth; but if any one should say the *fact* of gravitation—the fact that they attract each other—causes bodies to fall to the earth, he would say what is exactly and punctually true. The law of gravitation describes *how* bodies fall: the fact of gravitation explains *why* they fall; and the explanation is as good and as valid as the description. As far as I know, Professor Pearson never answers the actual arguments of real antagonists; and if he prefers the easier task of answering silly arguments that he puts into the mouth of an imaginary antagonist, then, whatever we may think of his courage and sincerity, we cannot question his wisdom.

"Mr. Bertrand Russell follows Professor Pearson in denying the existence of causes. He say there are no such things. He wants the word abolished, and regards the law of causation, or, as he calls it, of causality, as a relic of a bygone age. To prove this contention he selects from Baldwin's *dictionary* the definitions given therein of Causality, of the notion of Cause and Effect, and so forth; he takes one of Mill's definitions of Causation, and an expression of Bergson's, and analyzes them all destructively.

"All these expressions assume, and Mr. Russell repeatedly in his own expressions assumes, that repetition of instances is necessary before we can identify causation, and I think it is not too much to say that he regards recurrence or repetition as a necessary element, either in causation itself, or in our idea of causation.... He confutes the succession in time of cause and effect, or that antecedence and consequence on which Mill and his school lay so much stress: 'No two instants are contiguous, since the time series is compact.' I cannot see that the conclusion follows from the premise. It seems to me that the more compact the time series, the more closely contiguous must be its instants. If Mr. Russell means that time is continuous, and not made up of instants separated from one another by intervals that are not time, or in which there is no time, I should agree with him; but it is only in such an interrupted time series that the instants would not be contiguous. An instant, like an hour or a day, is a portion of time arbitrarily divided by an imaginary limit from that which precedes and that which follows, with both of which it is continuous or contiguous. But if Mr. Russell is right, and no two instants are contiguous, and if serial contiguity in time between cause and effect is necessary to causation, then this settles the question: then causation is impossible, and Mr. Russell's further argument is redundant, supererogatory, and unnecessary. But he does not think so.....

"He goes on to show that if cause and effect are not contiguous in time, then there must be an interval between them; and 'since there are no infinitesimal time intervals' this lapse of time must be finite. But if there is a finite interval of time between cause and effect, something may happen in that interval to prevent the effect following the cause. It is all very pretty word spinning, and for all I know it may apply to the kind of 'causality' that occurs in the moon, or in a universe of one dimension, but it has no relation whatever to causation as it is known on this earth. Mr. Russell assumes that effect follows cause in the sense of what carpenters call a butt joint, in the sense that the effect does not begin until the cause has ceased to act. That may be what happens in some other universe, but it is not what happens here. What happens here is quite different, as Mr. Russell might have known if he had considered an actual case of causation instead of speculating with $e_1, e_2, \ldots e_n$, and $t_1, t_2, \ldots t_n$, and τ. When, for instance, a man pushes a trolley, he causes it to move. The pushing is the cause, the movement is the effect. But the effect is not postponed until the cause has ceased to act. The effect does not come into existence at an instant contiguous to the cessation of the cause. The effect begins as soon, or almost as soon, as the cause begins; thereafter, cause and effect, the pushing and the movement, accompany one another, and proceed contemporaneously for a certain time; and at length, when the cause ceases, the effect ceases. Cause is contiguous to effect in this case, not end to end, but side by side for the greater portion of their duration. The joint is not a butt joint but a fish joint; and all Mr. Bertrand Russell's pretty word spinning goes for nothing.

"His own statement of 'causality' cannot, he says, be put accurately in non-mathematical language; the nearest approach would be as follows: 'There is a constant relation between the state of the universe at any instant, and the rate of change at which any part of the universe is changing at that instant, such that the rate of change in the rate of change is determinate when the state of the universe is given.' It is with diffidence that I comment on this mysterious formula, but it seems to me clear that if anything can be discovered by its means, it is not the cause of a change, but the rate at which a change takes place, or rather the rate of change in a rate of change; which may be a desirable thing to know, but by no perversity of ingenuity can be twisted or tortured into a cause. But suppose the impossible to be true, and suppose that no cause of any thing can be discovered or assigned unless and until the state of the whole universe is known; then it is clear that no cause of anything ever has been discovered or ever can be discovered, for we can never know the state of the whole universe. But in fact many causes of many things are known, and more are being discovered every day. I know, for instance, that pushing a trolley is a cause of the movement of that trolley. I know that reading such disquisitions as Mr. Welton's, Professor Pearson's, and Mr. Bertrand Russell's, are among the causes of the estimate I have formed of philosophers. Mr. Bertrand Russell may be a great mathematician, Professor Pearson a great statistician, and Mr. Welton a great authority on education; but there is a certain proverb about the cobbler and his last that I would commend to the notice of all three. It may be that I must determine the state of this earth, and of everything upon it, in it, and around it; of all its continents, seas, rivers, lakes, and islands; of all its minerals, from the coal to the diamond; of all its vegetables, from the bacillus to the oak and the orchid; of all its animals, from the spirochæte to the whale; of all its human inhabitants, from the Bushman to Mr. Russell himself; and beyond this, of all the solar system, with its planets, planetary streams, satellites, and comets; of all the stars which we call fixed, with their temperatures, positions, sizes, movements, and chemical composition—it may be that I must know all these things with accuracy before I can discover what it is that is tickling my nose; but for my own part I don't believe it. In fact, I do not know all these things, I know only some of them, and I have already discovered the cause. No doubt

Mr. Bertrand Russell knows best, but my own private belief is that though mathematics cannot err, mathematicians can....

"For thorough mystification, and for the most extreme departure from plain meaning and common sense, Dr. McTaggart runs Mr. Bertrand Russell very hard. According to Dr. McTaggart, 'causation is a relation of implication between existent realities—or to put it more precisely, between existent substances.' This does not on the face of it afford us much help in understanding what causation is, but unlike most philosophers, Dr. McTaggart defines his terms, and for this one cannot be sufficiently grateful to him, not only on general grounds, but also for the surprising meanings that he shows lurk unsuspected in the most ordinary terms. A substance, for instance, according to Dr. McTaggart, is anything that can have qualities and relations; so that, for instance, the battle of Waterloo and a flash of lightning are substances in the McTaggartian sense. This is a bit startling, but definitions are so rare in philosophy that we must be thankful for any we can get, even if they leave us more mystified than before. The battle of Waterloo is presumably not only a substance but also an existing substance in the McTaggartian world, though to the rest of us it ceased to exist a hundred years ago. Causation, then, is a relation of implication between such existing substances as the battle of Waterloo and a flash of lightning; but what is a relation of implication? Here again Dr. McTaggart comes to the rescue with a definition. A relation of implication is a relation between two propositions, P and Q, such that P implies Q, when, if I know P to be true, I am justified by that alone in asserting that Q is true, and if I know Q to be false, I am justified by that alone in asserting P to be false.

"So far, so good, but still we are a long way from attaining a clear idea of causation; but Dr. McTaggart is not done yet. 'Strictly speaking,' he says, 'implication is a relation between propositions or truths [is a proposition, then, necessarily true?] and not between events . But it is convenient to extend our use of it, so as to say that if one proposition implies another, then the event asserted in the first implies the event asserted in the second [but how if neither of them asserts an event?]. It is in this sense that the cause implies the effect'—causes it, in fact. The jump from propositions to events is a bit startling to those who are not accustomed to the proper meaning of realities and substances, but interpreting these expressions to the best of my ability, I gather that when we say the cause implies the effect, we mean that if the cause is true the effect is true, and if the effect is false the cause is false. But what on earth is the meaning of a cause or an effect being true or false? It does not appear that by a true cause Dr. McTaggart means the *causa vera* of the Schools, but what he does mean I cannot conjecture; and supposing this difficulty to be cleared up, what is the meaning of a false effect? Is it an effect that never happens? or is it an effect that is wrongly attributed to a certain cause? or is it something else? It is to be regretted that Dr. McTaggart has not supplemented his definitions with others, explaining the meaning of these terms. In this difficulty the only practicable expedient is to clothe the expression in circumstances—to apply the general rule to an individual case.

"I take, therefore, two propositions, 'Brutus killed Cæsar,' and 'Brutus and Cæsar were contemporaries,' which stand in relation of implication; for if P, or Brutus killed Cæsar, is true, then we are justified by that alone in asserting the truth of Q, that they were contemporaries; and if Q, or Brutus and Cæsar were contemporaries, is false, then we are justified by that alone in asserting the falsity of P, that Brutus killed Cæsar. This specimen fulfils all Dr. McTaggart's conditions. The relation is undoubtedly a relation of implication; and the killing of Cæsar by Brutus is a substance, for it can have qualities, such as treachery, unexpectedness, rapidity, and so forth. It does not seem to me to be an existing substance, it is true, but it is as much an existing substance as the battle of Waterloo. The contemporaneousness of Brutus and Cæsar is a relation, and therefore this also is a substance, and to the same extent the other is an existing substance. All the conditions being satisfied, we may therefore predicate a relation of causation between these two existing substances; but now our difficulties begin, for I cannot understand whether the fact that Brutus killed Cæsar caused them to live at the same time, or whether the fact that they were contemporaries caused Brutus to kill Cæsar, If the latter, why did not all his other contemporaries kill Cæsar? and why did not Cæsar kill Brutus? If the former, what caused Brutus and Cæsar to have so many other contemporaries? I have puzzled over these problems till my brain is almost turned, and I am no nearer a solution, and am obliged to give them up. I doubt whether any one but Dr. McTaggart could solve them; and a method which is useless in the hands of every one but its inventor is never likely to become popular.

"Dr. McTaggart arrives at certain other conclusions that are interesting. He decides that there is no reason to believe 'that a cause exerts an activity or an effect.' What is meant by a cause exerting an effect I do not know, and another definition would be useful here; but if Dr. McTaggart means that a cause does not produce an effect, then I respectfully submit that it is not a cause. Moreover, if a cause does not exert an activity, it is only because it *is* an activity, or more properly an action. Cause and activity can no more be divorced than heat and motion, or solidity and resistance. Dr. McTaggart decides that cause and effect are not identical, a discovery that will not, I think, astonish any one but Mr. Welton; that the effect is not necessarily subsequent to the cause, and, indeed, he is not quite sure that the effect may not sometimes come first, and the cause follow after it; and at last he declares, in despair it seems to me, that though cause and effect are not identical, yet there is no means of knowing which is which, or at any rate, there is no clear distinction between them; and therefore, though we may speak of causal relations as existing between two terms, yet we ought not to speak of one of those terms as cause, and of the other as effect. I think we may legitimately complain that Dr. Taggart does not tell us what we ought to call them. Ought we to call them both X, or the one X and the other Y? Ought we to call the one beef, and the other Yorkshire pudding? Or ought we to call the one petticoat and the other trousers? Dr. McTaggart gives us no guidance, and the reader must choose for himself.

"The lecture in which Dr. McTaggart expounded these views was delivered at Newnham College, presumably to an audience of young women, and I trust he developed to them his views of the impropriety of naming the related terms when describing relations. He convinced them, I trust, that it is convenient to speak of the relation of marriage, but inconvenient (and perhaps improper), to speak of bride and bridegroom, or of husband and wife; that it is convenient to speak of parentage, but not of parents or of children; that it is convenient to speak of the relation of cousinhood, but that they should never allow themselves to use such expressions as Harry or Mary."

The second chapter defines effect, reason, result, cause, and the third is devoted to condition. The fourth deals with causation itself and works up to the author's definition of the term (page 75) as "the necessary connection between an action and the sequent change or accompanying unchange in the thing acted on." Then follows a chapter on "Subsidiary Problems," the last of which is the uniformity of nature. In his first chapter Dr. Mercier had quaintly observed that "no two philosophers agree on what is to be meant by the uniformity of nature; the only thing on which they agree, and when they do agree their unanimity is wonderful, is that nature is not uniform." Chapters six and seven treat various methods of ascertaining causes, and errors in attributing causation and finally one chapter is given to the practical subject of causes of death and insanity. It is an attempt to guide the physician in determining the primary and secondary causes of death as required in England by the Registrar General, and to avoid the confusion of a certain complex "table of causes" of insanity issued by the British Board of Control.

The chapter on belief was added as an afterthought at the request of a friend who was puzzled as to what to believe and disbelieve. In this the author makes no claim to philosophical profundity, but endeavors to furnish a basis by which the ordinary thoughtful man may avoid believing things that are irrational, baseless, absurd or self-contradictory. We quote the author's summary of this chapter (pages 227-228):

"The different meanings of 'believe' are defined, and the meanings of various cognate expressions explained. An assertion of any degree of belief or disbelief expresses an attitude of mind either directly toward a fact, or, while directly toward a statement, indirectly toward the fact stated.

"A fact means anything existing or happening, in the past, present, or future.

"Belief ought to conform to fact, but cannot be directly related to fact, for we have no direct knowledge of fact. Between belief and fact there is always the intermediary of evidence. It is evidence and not fact that impresses our minds, and when we have brought our belief, or the want of it, into accordance with the evidence, we have done all we can, and can do no more.

"Evidence is of three kinds: Evidence of sense, evidence of reason, evidence of hearsay.

"Evidence of sense is certain as to the sensation only; but sensation is of little value until it is interpreted, that is, until its source or cause is arrived at by the elementary process of reasoning called perception. This process may be faulty, and the percept false, or erroneous.

"Evidence of reason gives us two criteria of certainty. That which cannot be conceived is certainly false, and its contradictory is certainly true, and constitutes an axiomatic truth or certainty. It is necessary, in using this test, to be careful not to confuse, as Mill and Spencer did, inconceivability with incredibility.

"Empirical certainty rests upon constancy in experience. That relation which has been found constant (i. e., never contradicted) in experiences diverse and incalculably numerous, is true for us, and cannot be believed to be false, although its contradictory may be conceivable.

"If the relation is not constant in experience, then the degree of belief ought to correspond with the proportion that the positive instances in experience of the relation bear to the negative instances, in which the terms of the relation occur apart. The more nearly constant in experience the relation, the more carefully should apparent exceptions be scrutinized.

"Evidence of hearsay may be maximally trustworthy or may be worthless. The following are the criteria to be depended on:

"1. The statement must be understood in the same sense by the receiver as by the assertor.

"2. The witness must be a witness of truth so far as he knows the truth.

"3. The witness must have means of knowing the truth.

"4. The hearsay evidence must not be inconsistent, or even incongruous with experience.

"Whoso makes an assertion, on him lies the burden of proof. No attention should be paid to bare assertion unsupported by evidence.

"Evidence is anything germane to the issue, and consistent with the assertion.

"Proof is evidence inconsistent with any alternative to the assertion.

"Disproof is evidence inconsistent with the assertion.

"The evidence of a single witness may be received in proportion to his previous record for truthfulness, and in proportion to his responsibility, that is to say to the ill-consequences that would accrue to him if he were found to have given false testimony; also to his freedom from interest and bias in making his assertion.

"The evidence of a plurality of witnesses is valuable in proportion to their independence of one another. Evidence of many independent witnesses goes to prove an assertion if they have means of knowing the truth, and if the assertion is consistent with experience. Otherwise, the evidence of witnesses, however many and however unanimous, has no value."

Though we hesitate to draw inferences with regard to an author who has such a ready eye for fallacies, it seems to us that the logical consequent of this chapter ought to be an essay on New Testament criticism or at least on that phase which deals with the doctrine of the resurrection of Jesus.

EDITOR.

LAWRENCE HEYWORTH MILLS.

1837-1918.

On February first despatches from London announced to American newspapers the death of one of those great Oriental scholars whose researches in difficult fields have been the glory of the nineteenth century. Lawrence Heyworth Mills, professor of Zend philology at Oxford since 1898, died at the ripe age of eighty-one years. In him science and literature lose another great figure, one of those who faithfully and courageously pursued the missionary labor of revealing the religious lore of the great, dead civilizations of the East to a West, which in its selfsufficiency always reacted but slowly and unwillingly to messages deemed by its utilitarian spirit to be of little, or at least, of questionable worth.

Though Professor Mills left for a permanent residence in Europe in 1872, he was of American birth, and we select from Dr. Carus's warm tribute to an esteemed contributor to *Open Court* and *Monist,* as found on pages 505 to 509 of volume XIII, the following salient facts.

He was born in New York in 1837 of German and Irish ancestry, long resident in colonial America. Educated for the ministry and ordained, he was active in ecclesiastical duties from 1861 to 1872 in our country and then in the Protestant Episcopal church